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Abstract:
This publication describes techniques aimed at detecting and preventing return-oriented
programming (ROP) attacks. The techniques consist of a software adaptation which enables
supplemental hardware, specifically a system on a chip (SoC), to chronologically log return (ret)
addresses of pushed stack frames and compare those logged ret addresses to ret commands
executed by a central processing unit (CPU) of a computing system. When the SoC determines
that ret commands executed by the CPU have deviated from the logged ret addresses, then the SoC
can take action to thwart a ROP attack.
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Background:
Computing systems (e.g., smartphones, computers, tablets) store and process data
according to executable machine instructions provided by software (e.g., programs, applications
operating systems (OS)), referred to as program control flow. When software on a computing
system invokes a callable unit (e.g., a function, a procedure, a subroutine), a processor (e.g.,
Central Processing Unit (CPU)) in the system allocates space in its memory (e.g., the random-
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access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM)) for that callable unit to operate. This allocated
space is often referred to as a stack frame.
Each stack frame corresponds to an invocation of a callable unit which has not yet
terminated with a return. In other words, a stack frame is produced when a function, for example,
is invoked, but has not yet executed. For instance, take the factorial of the number five as a
function. In order to generate the factorial of five, the factorial of four must be computed, and so
on unto the number one. For this process to occur, the factorial of five function was put on hold
and the factorial of four function was invoked; this was continued unto the first executable
function, specifically the factorial of the number one. The number one would be multiplied by
itself, resulting in one. The preceding function, specifically the factorial of the number two, would
then multiply the result by two. This method of returning to the previous function would continue
unto the factorial of five function and produce a result of 120. In summary, the factorial of five
function instigated the generation of many functions to produce a result. The production of
multiple callable units that need dedicated space in memory (stack frames) to operate—seemingly
stacking on top of each other—is referred to as a call stack. A call stack is a dynamic data-structure
maintained inside the memory management unit, specifically the RAM, of the computing system
by the OS. The purpose of a call stack is to control the way callable units call and pass parameters
to each other.
Figure 1 illustrates an example call stack.
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Figure 1
The call stack illustrated in Figure 1 is composed of three x86 stack frames (Main ( ),
Function 1 ( ), and Function 2 ( )). A call stack can contain many stack frames, depending on the
callable unit and the memory of the computing system. As illustrated, stack frames may be
comprised of local variables, registers, arguments, and return (ret) addresses. Ret addresses are
virtual addresses that originate from a computing system’s CPU program counter. Ret addresses
are later used to return back to and execute the preceding callable unit.
When a callable unit (e.g., Function 1 ( )) invokes another callable unit (e.g., Function 2 (
)), the parameters, local variables, etc. are pushed on the call stack in a single stack frame. When
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the callable unit associated with the stack frame at the top of the call stack has fully executed, then
the stack frame is eliminated (popped off) from the call stack.
Call stacks are integral to the operations of a computing system. A modern method of
attack on the processes of computing systems is centered around the call stack. Return-oriented
programming (ROP) attacks are a combination of stack overflow and reverse engineering existing
machine instruction sequences/segments (gadgets) inside of call stacks; effectively creating new,
malicious software flows that enable the attacker to execute malicious code on a computing
system. Generally, these gadgets are instruction groups that end with a ret address. In short, a
ROP attack would entail an attacker collecting and executing a string of reverse engineered gadgets
(e.g., arguments to pass).
It is desirable to detect and prevent ROP attacks. To this end, the process of comparing
executed ret commands (e.g., a code instruction to return to a certain address) to logged ret
addresses as the stack frames were pushed onto the call stack can aid in thwarting ROP attacks.

Description:
This publication describes techniques aimed at detecting and preventing return-oriented
programming (ROP) attacks. The techniques incorporate the addition of computing hardware,
specifically a system on a chip (SoC), and a software adaptation to computing systems.
Figure 2 illustrates the SoC added to a computing system.
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Figure 2
As illustrated in Figure 2, the computing system is a smartphone.

However, other

computing systems (e.g., tablets, computers) can also support the techniques described in this
publication. The computing system includes a native central processing unit (CPU) and a memory
management unit (MMU). The MMU may be located within the native CPU or as a separate
integrated chip. Regardless of location, the MMU translates addresses between the native CPU
and physical memory, such as random-access memory (RAM). This translation process will be
referred to herein as the Virtual to Physical addresses translation.
The computing system also includes a SoC. The SoC may include one or more processors
(e.g., a CPU) and a memory device such as RAM, static RAM (SRAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM),
non-volatile RAM (NVRAM), read-only memory (ROM), flash memory, or the like.

As

illustrated, bussing connects the SoC to the CPU of the computing system. The SoC can have
connectivity to the MMU either through direct or indirect bussing depending on the location of the
MMU. This connectivity permits the SoC to monitor the Virtual to Physical addresses translation.
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The software adaptation utilized with the SoC entails a modification to the implementation
of the branch/jump command, such that when new callable units (e.g., functions, procedures,
subroutines) are invoked and new stack frames are pushed on top of the call stack, a ticket or a
descriptor is posted to the SoC with the return address being jumped from (i.e., current program
counter), enabling the SoC to keep a data-structure (e.g., a stack) of these addresses per process.
In addition, the software adaptation permits the SoC to monitor the callable units or gadgets
(existing machine instruction segments) executed by the CPU and the units’ or gadgets’ associated
stack frame return address (ret command). In other words, with a change to the implementation
to ret commands, each ret command will post the return address of the return register (e.g., EBP
for x86) to the SoC and the SoC can then compare the executed ret commands to the return
addresses logged in the data-structure.
Figure 3 illustrates the techniques utilized to detect and prevent ROP attacks.

Figure 3
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As illustrated in Figure 3, the MMU contains a call stack. The call stack contains two stack
frames (Function 1 ( ) and Function 2 ( )), each with their respective return address: return address
1 and return address 2. For illustrative purposes, this example call stack at one time contained five
stack frames. As the stack frames were pushed on top of the call stack, a ticket or descriptor with
the return address of the stack frame jumped from was logged in the data-structure. As illustrated,
the CPU returned to return address 2 and then returned to return address 5. In other words, the
CPU executed Function 1 ( )—the stack frame with return address 2—and then executed a gadget
with a return address identifying it as originating from the fifth stack frame; whereas the datastructure on the SoC indicates that the CPU should have executed the Main ( ) function
immediately after Function 1 ( ). Since the SoC monitors the executions of the native CPU and
compares the executed ret commands to the logged return addresses, it identified this event as a
ROP attack.
These transactions can be implemented in one of two ways: a posted wait or a non-posted
wait. The posted wait option avoids latency but detects a ROP attack with a slight delay. In other
words, the ROP attack may execute a few gadgets, but the completion of the ROP attack is
prevented. Alternatively, the non-posted wait permits the SoC to immediately check every ret
command executed against the logged return addresses and thwart a ROP attack instantly after
detecting deviation from the data-structure; this method, however, sacrifices computing
performance. In both ways, though, ROP attacks can be successfully detected.
Additional benefits provided by these techniques can be manifest in the addition of single
root input/output virtualization (SR-IOV) capabilities. For instance, adding SR-IOV capabilities
to the SoC make it usable by virtual machines running on a server, allowing the same benefit to
cloud-based virtual machines.
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In conclusion, a software adaptation that enables a supplemental SoC to log return
addresses of pushed stack frames and compare those logged return addresses to ret commands
executed by the CPU of the computing system, affords computing systems a method of detecting
and preventing ROP attacks.
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